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A Novel Dictionary Generation Methodology for Contextual-Based Password Cracking

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ABSTRACT It has been more than 50 years since the concept of passwords was introduced and adopted in our society as a digital authentication method. Despite alternative authentication methods being developed later, it is reasonable to assume that this prevailing authentication method will not fall out of popularity anytime soon. Naturally, each password is closely connected to its creator. This connection has given rise to advanced techniques aimed at exploiting user habits for password cracking. Such techniques are often generic approaches that leverage large datasets of human-created passwords. Recent research has underlined the influence that context can have during password selection for a user. This information could be of significant added value when digital investigators need to target a specific user or group of users during a criminal investigation. There are no automated approaches that can extract and utilize contextual information during the password cracking processes. In this paper, a methodology and framework for creating custom dictionary word lists for dictionary-based password cracking attacks are introduced, with a specific focus on leveraging contextual information encountered during an investigation. Furthermore, a detailed explanation of the framework's implementation is provided, and the benefits of the approach are demonstrated with the use of test cases.

INDEX TERMS Password cracking candidate generation, context based password cracking, password cracking, wordlist creation.

I. INTRODUCTION

Despite known security concerns, password-based authentication remains the most widely used method of authentication [1]. A 2021 study showed that the online identity of almost one in three Americans was stolen in the last year alone, and another 13% were uncertain whether their credentials were part of a data breach [2]. In a spirit of strengthening security, password policies are nowadays more restrictive and require users to select stronger passwords. Salting the passwords¹ additionally increases the complexity of password cracking process, as each salt must be considered sequentially. Salting renders the commonly used rainbow table based password cracking approach obsolete. Typically, the password remains the weakest link to gain entry into a

system [3]. This weakness is accentuated when an attacker is focusing on gaining access to a multi-user system and not targeting any one specific user. A single weak password could grant attackers access to such a system, rendering the effort and precautions taken by security concerned system administrators void. In these cases, attackers focus on generic approaches – effectively modeling the popular habits and trends of real-world users' password choices [4]. These attacks use large dictionaries of human-created passwords available online from previous data leaks/breaches. Furthermore, attacks have evolved to become more refined and sophisticated to compensate for the increase in computational cost of the underlying algorithms and the strengthening of password policies [5].

Of course, there are also targeted attacks that focus on one specific user. For example, this is the case for law enforcement during a lawful criminal investigation, e.g., attempting to retrieve evidence from a suspect's online/offline account or whenever encrypted devices are encountered during digital

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¹The salt is a random string (typically 3 to 5 random characters) that is concatenated to the password before hashing it for database storage.

forensic examination [6]. Of course, generic approaches can be attempted, as they rely on mimicking user tendencies or they leverage passwords originating from data leaks. However, this use case can also benefit from a more targeted context-based approach. This targeted approach should take into account the fact that users often follow certain habits when creating their passwords. Their use of numbers and symbols is often meaningful, and the placement of capital letters and non-alphabetical characters is often predictable [7]. Users choose passwords that are memorable or meaningful to them. This is due to the fact that a typical user maintains tens of different passwords for different systems and devices. Since these password habits exist, the knowledge of personal information about a specific user can lead to more educated guesses of their passwords. This information could include important dates in their lives, names of family and friends, related locations, as well as their interests, likes, and dislikes. A particularly insightful piece of personal information could turn out to be their password, or part thereof.

In this manner, password candidates lists (dictionaries) bespoke to each individual can be created. Often, this information is easily and publicly available online, e.g., accessible on their social media profiles or professional websites. In the case of a law enforcement investigation, additional information could be obtained through warrants, interrogations, etc.

Taking the bespoke approach one step further, thematic dictionary lists around specific topics can be assembled. In terms of law enforcement, there is a significant potential benefit from this in expediting cases. During an investigation, it can be of paramount importance to gain access to encrypted devices, an often insurmountable task given limited resources [8]. Manually creating customized dictionaries for each suspect would be a very time-consuming process. To overcome this, having some established lists on commonly encountered topics and interests could result in an optimized start to the password guessing process.

In this paper, a methodology for creating bespoke and topic-specific dictionary lists is introduced, starting with a single contextual seed word. Dictionary lists are fully customizable; the length of the list and the contextual broadness of the generated password candidates are customizable by the user. Merging lists from multiple seed words is also an option. An evaluation of the proposed methodology is presented and the first assessment that demonstrates the viability and impact of context-based password cracking is outlined. The contribution of this work includes:

- The design of a novel methodology for creating bespoke dictionary lists based off a user's interests or specific topics with customizable depth of search is provided.
- Several experiments on a prototype implementation are described, assessing the impact of the proposed approach on password cracking.
- The benefits of the proposed approach over existing approaches alone are demonstrated.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II offers an overview of related work in the field, focusing

specifically on user tendencies when it comes to password creation and password strength. Section III presents the proposed methodology for creating bespoke dictionary lists and outlines the details of how the methodology has been implemented, providing an in-depth explanation of the development choices made. Section V presents some proof-of-concept experiments using the resultant password candidate dictionaries compared to a commonly used baseline in the literature. Finally, the paper culminates with a discussion of the results and the conclusions and future work are outlined.

II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

This section provides some related work and background information in the field of password cracking to appreciate the context of the proposed methodology.

A. PASSWORD CRACKING TECHNIQUES

The most straightforward password cracking technique is an exhaustive search (also called a brute force attack) where all combinations of a given alphabet, including digits and special characters, up to predetermined length are tested. With no defined maximum password length or limits for attempts, exhaustive searches are guaranteed to work – the only variable is time. Nowadays, passwords up to 8 characters long can be checked in a reasonable amount of time with just a single GPU [8]. For longer passwords or when the targeted hash function is not optimal, this approach is not efficient and is deemed computationally infeasible.

Therefore, many other methods have been developed to close that gap, such as rainbow tables, dictionary lists (with or without password candidate mangling rules) and more recently machine learning approaches. Rainbow tables are a time-memory trade-off focused on precomputing an almost exhaustive predefined search space of passwords. These tables store a minimal amount of information enabling fast recovery of a given password if it fits into the predefined search space [9]. The use of salting in password-based authentication methods makes rainbow table-based approaches entirely obsolete, as one rainbow table would need to be constructed for each possible salt, of which there are near infinite possibilities.

When it comes to machine learning methods, these include Markov-based models to significantly reduce the size of the password space that needs to be searched [10], probabilistic context-free grammars [11], and neural networks to model the resistance of human-chosen passwords to guessing attacks [12]. One such example of a neural network is Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs); where a neural network is developed to create password candidates that are as close to the distribution of real passwords originating from real-world password leaks [13].

One of the most common password-cracking methods remains the dictionary-based attack. Dictionary attacks are often combined with a set of password mangling rules that specifies the variations to the dictionary word will be tried – these rules aim to mimic common real-world user behavior when creating a password. For example, replacing letters with

numbers or symbols, e.g., replacing 'i' with '1' or '!', letter capitalizations, or adding numbers/symbols at the beginning, middle or end, etc.

B. PASSWORD SELECTION TRENDS

The number of accounts that every regular computer user owns is increasing. Single Sign-On (SSO) approaches and/or password managers can assist users in password management, while simultaneously strengthening the passwords used. However, as shown by [14], these approaches are still not yet widely adopted. Consequently, a large proportion of users re-use their passwords [15]–[17]. This is likely to avoid having to remember an increasing number of increasingly complex passwords (enforced through increasingly strict password policies). Reusing passwords with/without slight modifications among different services significantly reduces their security. For example, if one of these passwords is leaked, all login credentials that re-use the leaked password, or a variation thereof, are in danger of compromise and should be considered as unsafe [18].

When looking at leaked password lists from various data breaches, common trends have emerged in password selection. For example, when asked to create a password with lowercase and uppercase letters, users are likely to capitalize the first letter of their password [7]. When asked to include numbers and/or special characters in their passwords, they are very likely to use number sequences such as '123', number repetitions such as '111', meaningful numbers such as '314', or use letter substitutions such as '@' for 'a' and '1' for 'i' [7]. One study showed that users tend to believe that adding digits to the password increases the complexity of guessing it, while the use of keyboard patterns and common phrases was not perceived as a bad password practice [19].

A study focused on Chinese users [20] showed that more than 50% had passwords that consisted of only digits. The same study also showed that professionals generally chose lengthier passwords than students, and 12% included personal information in their passwords, e.g., birth dates or years. Another study that analyzed RockYou (a popular password cracking dictionary used throughout the literature) showed that 4.5% of the passwords contained dates [21]. This type of information, while personal, is often easily accessible to adversaries [22].

Another analysis of passwords showed that password selection is far from random and that in fact it follows the distribution of natural language [23]. Users prefer to choose simple noun bigrams as found in natural language. When looking at differences in password preferences between people of different nationalities, some subtle differences were found by [24]. For example, the authors demonstrated that Arabic users were three times more likely to include their mobile phone number in their password, while people from India and Pakistan were more prone to use names.

It is therefore of significant interest to look more into password selection trends, what trend information can be derived and potentially leveraged in lawful password cracking.

C. PASSWORD STRENGTH

Enforcing the selection of strong passwords can help to protect digital systems from password cracking attacks. Password strength meters fulfill strength evaluation requirements forbidding users from inadvertently selecting weak passwords. However, a comparison study conducted on strength meters from some of the most popular websites and systems showed they are highly inconsistent [25]. The same password on different strength meters can be evaluated from adequate to great, depending on what parameters each meter uses for its evaluation. These parameters include entropy, length, estimated number of guesses it would take to crack the password, etc.

The use of password strength meters can have the desired effect of users choosing more difficult passwords to fulfill the meter's requirements, but subsequently need to resort to writing the password down because they cannot remember them [26]. Furthermore, entropy, which is one of the most common measures of password strength, has been shown to be an ineffective metric against intelligence-based attacks [27].

In order to mitigate against these issues, various alternatives to password meters have been proposed, e.g., limiting the number of login attempts, two-factor authentication, and the use of graphical passwords [28] or mnemonic based passwords. More recently, other methods have been proposed where Markov Chain methods are leveraged to create a multi-modal strength metric for passwords [29].

III. DICTIONARY CREATION METHODOLOGY

As mentioned in the previous section, dictionary attacks are an effective way to crack passwords. There are many publicly available dictionary lists that are used for the purpose of password cracking, many of which originating from leaked password lists from data breaches. One of the most famous lists is RockYou. This list originates from the RockYou company leak in 2009. The complete list of passwords from this leak are available as they were stored in plaintext by the company.

To this end, it seems logical that the best way to increase the chances of cracking a password (or cracking as many passwords as possible) from a list of hashed passwords is to create a more robust dictionary list. The dictionary generation approach proposed as part of this work leverages the fact that: 1) users tend to choose passwords based on real words, 2) users choose passwords that are meaningful to them, and/or 3) users often use personal information including names, birth dates, places, and interests, e.g., sports, cars, popular cultural references, etc. This selection of features is based on statistical analysis of over 3.9 billion real-world passwords [7]. The authors used the HaveIBeenPwned dataset to deconstruct the passwords down into their constituent components and classify them according to context. This analysis demonstrated that the aforementioned categories are some of the most popular chosen in the real world.




FIGURE 1. A depiction of the tree-like structure of Wikipedia.

A reasonable hypothesis is that if a user is tasked with defining a password for a website of a specific topic, the probability that this password might be thematically close to that topic is higher, e.g., more likely to choose a car related password for a car forum. Therefore, a dictionary generation strategy based on thematic categories can prove useful. Ideally, the building of a diverse portfolio of dictionaries for various contexts can be used alone or in combination according to a specific target.

The approach outlined as part of this paper for creating dictionaries starts with Wikipedia.² The reasoning behind this is that each page in Wikipedia provides links to other Wikipedia entries that are thematically close – from a semantic, cultural and common association standpoint. This thematic linking of content can be pictured as a tree-like structure stemming from the root word, or seed phrase. This tree-like structure enables the selection of a starting point and the definition of the depth and breadth of the exploration. An example of the tree-like structure of Wikipedia can be seen in Figure 1.

An example of the Wikipedia-driven topic hierarchy is shown in Figure 1. Assuming that the seed topic is “Manga”, each of the links referenced in manga’s Wikipedia entry leads to further related Wikipedia pages, from different types of manga, to famous Japanese actors, writers, and illustrators, to manga-related TV networks, etc. Proceeding down one level, i.e., visiting each of these Wikipedia entries, leads to further new related pages, and so on. For the purpose of collecting this information from Wikipedia, DBPedia was used, as outlined in further detail in the following section.

A. DBPedia

DBPedia³ is a crowd-sourced project aiming to offer a structured manner to access the information found in Wikipedia. The DBPedia information contains the abstract of each article found on each Wikipedia page, as well as the information contained in the article’s infobox. The infobox contains a summary of the most relevant information related to each article. As infoboxes in Wikipedia do not consistently follow

a single structure, that information is collected with mappings. Mappings assign each entity in the infobox a DBpedia ontology type so that each attribute in the infobox is mapped to the DBpedia ontology [30]. This provides an easy way to leverage the structure and links between Wikipedia pages, providing an interconnecting web of content that is thematically related.

1) KEYWORD EXTRACTION

In order to extract information from DBPedia, the Python library `rdflib`⁴ is used, which is a library for the Resource Description Framework (RDF).⁵ RDF is a data model that is used to merge graph data when the underlying schemas differ.

B. CREATING THE LAYERS

The starting point for creating a context based dictionary is a single seed word/topic/phrase and its corresponding DBPedia article. For example, if the objective is to create a dictionary about Manga, the starting point would be the DBPedia page for Manga. The first step is to collect all the links on the Manga entry that point to other related entries. As these are directly connecting to manga, as part of this paper they are referred to as the first layer. The next step is to visit these new entries and repeat the same process; collecting more and more links along the way. Consequently, each new link is classified into a different layer, according to how many “hops” it is from the starting point of the graph. A reasonable assumption that is made at this stage is that a link that resides in layer one, i.e., directly linked to the Manga entry, is likely to be thematically more relevant to Manga than a link that is on layer two, three, or subsequent layers.

Furthermore, each new layer added significantly increases the complexity. As one example, layer one for the DBPedia article for Manga contains 314 entries, while layer two contains 19,727. Additionally, as many of these entries are interconnected, i.e., the Manga entry points to the Dragon Ball Z entry and vice versa, particular care is taken not to include any repeating entries. The interconnected web of

²wikipedia.org

³https://www.dbpedia.org/

⁴https://rdflib.readthedocs.io/en/stable/

⁵https://www.w3.org/RDF/




FIGURE 2. A methodology diagram for creating a dictionary from Wikipedia/DBpedia.

the articles can also be used as a relevancy metric for each page encountered – similar to one of the indicator’s web search engines use to determine a webpage’s relevancy based on how many pages link to it, such as Google’s PageRank algorithm [31].

A comprehensive diagram of the proposed process is shown in Figure 2. The length and scope of this list can be configured at the moment of generation. It can be limited to one layer, referred to as “contextual dictionary 1” (CD_1) as part of this work, two layers (CD_2), three layers (CD_3), etc. With each new layer added, the quantity of data increases exponentially. Therefore, the trade-off between speed, dictionary length, and ultimate success rate is a consideration [32].

Furthermore, among the links contained in a Wikipedia (and corresponding DBpedia entry), some generic and non-topic-specific links can be found. These usually are used for Wikipedia’s internal hierarchy and labeling of contents in each entry, and these are excluded from the generated dictionaries.

C. DICTIONARY LIST SANITATION

At the culmination of the previous process, the first version of the dictionary list is created. At this point, subsequent steps are taken to sanitize this list and exclude entries (or partial entries) that are not contextually close to the starting seed word(s). Many linked pages from Wikipedia articles have the form *List of [Topic]* or *Categories: [Topic]*. For example, using the Manga seed word, some of the linked Wikipedia pages include “List of Japanese manga magazines by circulation” and “Categories: Languages of Japan”. Although the contents of these are thematically relevant and useful, these entries themselves do not offer added value and are therefore excluded from our dictionary list.

Regarding entries consisting of more than one word, each entry is included in the resultant password candidate dictionary list in two ways; as a concatenation of the words without spaces and as separate words. If these separate words consist of common stop words, they are removed. The removal of stop words happens for two main reasons; 1) this group of words does not provide any value to our process, and 2) as the size of the dictionary length decreases, a corresponding decrease in processing time follows [33]. As an example, if the entry *The Girl From Ipanema* is found, these three entries are added to the list: *TheGirlFromIpanema*, *Girl*, *Ipanema*.

IV. BENEFITS, LIMITATIONS, AND TRADE-OFFS

As can be seen in Figure 2, the starting point for the proposed contextual dictionary approach is a single Wikipedia article stemming from the available contextual information about a target individual or community. In any digital investigation, this bespoke dictionary generation step could be one of the first after collecting evidence on the individual related to his interests, hobbies, and other personal information. However, it might prove fruitful not to choose the bespoke dictionary approach from the get go. The reason for this is that users still tend to choose passwords that are not very difficult and possibly easy to crack with more unsophisticated methods, i.e., exhaustive search or “off-the-shelf” dictionary attacks. It is reasonable to first eliminate weak password candidates with an exhaustive search before using the approach outlined in this paper or to pursue both approaches simultaneously.

Furthermore, this exhaustive search can commence from the beginning of the investigation as it does not require collecting any other information, as it is entirely independent of any context. While the exhaustive search is carried out, evidence and information that can help launch the bespoke context-based dictionary attack can be collected.

This begs the question of where exactly in the password cracking pipeline the proposed approach might fit. The answer is that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to this question. If time is of the essence and it is known that the suspect is someone technologically and security savvy, then a reasonable assumption can be made that an exhaustive search of up to 8 characters is not likely to produce results; therefore, this choice may be skipped or postponed. If this is the case, but the process of collecting evidence to launch the targeted dictionary attack is still ongoing, another dictionary attack might take precedent.

As mentioned in Section II, dictionary attacks are one of the most popular types of password cracking techniques used. It can be argued either way whether a regular dictionary attack could take precedent over a context-based dictionary attack depending on the specific case and the number of passwords to be retrieved. A good approach would be to target easy-to-guess passwords first with a regular dictionary approach and then follow with a more intelligent attack for more difficult passwords later. If they are in possession of the investigator, previous passwords and variations thereof should be tested first. These can also offer insights into the suspect user's personal mangling rule selection. In any case, the specific parameters of the case will dictate the choice.

A significant consideration when choosing the proposed approach is the length of the generated dictionary. A smaller dictionary will allow for a larger number of combinations of mangling rules to be attempted over a fixed time period (or fixed number of guesses). Smaller dictionaries will result in more mangled attempts being made based on more relevant password candidates, e.g., passwords in CD_2 (which are direct links of the seed word) will be contextually closer to the seed word. As a result, given a fixed time (or fixed number of attempts), there is a trade-off to consider between checking more, i.e., more distant, password candidates and checking fewer, i.e., more related, candidates with more mangling rules. This is an especially important choice as more layers are added as the length of the dictionary list increases correspondingly.

The last consideration for the proposed approach is the information that is included in it. As the traversal from the seed word to subsequent layers is taking place, the decision was made to only include links found in each DBPedia article. The reason for this is once again based on a trade-off. In the initial design of this approach, adding the sanitized text of the abstract and/or article was considered. The approach consisted of an extraction of keywords from this text and the incorporation of them into the list along with the links. Ultimately, the inclusion of words from the abstract/article itself was decided against, as this did not offer any significant increase in value. It is also reasonable to assume that the links contained in each Wikipedia article are also the most important related topics to the original seed word. While, there is the possibility that some good password candidates are missed as a result of this decision, this trade-off is deemed acceptable to result in more relevant password candidates.

V. EXPERIMENTS

To measure the impact of contextual dictionaries, a number of password cracking experiments were conducted to compare the results of a contextual dictionary against a commonly-used baseline dictionary. The configuration of the experiments is described in the next section, and the results are evaluated.

A. SETUP AND DATASETS USED

To conduct the experiments, University College Dublin's Sonic High-Performance Computing Cluster was used. This cluster consists of 43 nodes with memory sizes ranging from 128Gb to 1.5Tb⁶. A leaked community of manga fans was chosen as the target community for the first experiment, using the term "manga" as the seed word for the generation of the dictionaries. The evaluation of the generated password candidate dictionaries relies on a leaked dataset from the website MangaTraders – a forum for Manga and Anime fans. The dataset used in this paper is made up of 618,237 unique passwords provided by the online service *hashes.org*.

As a second experiment, the Comb4 dataset [32], which consists of four datasets is used (one of which being MangaTraders). The other three datasets are Axemusic (data leak from music forum), Jeepforum (data leak from a car forum) and Minecraft (data leak from a video game forum). The sizes of these dictionary lists that make up Comb4 are shown in Table 1. The use of these datasets for the purpose of this research has been approved by the Office of Research Ethics in University College Dublin.

As a baseline to compare the results of these experiments against, the RockYou dictionary has been used. There are two publicly available versions of RockYou. The first consists of 32 million passwords with repeated password entries (providing insight to the most frequently used passwords). For the experimentation outlined as part of this paper, the frequency of passwords is not of use and the version of RockYou used consists of 14 million unique passwords.

When it comes to the generated dictionaries, the seed word used was "Manga" and two dictionaries of two and three layers, called CD_2 and CD_3 respectively, were produced. Their lengths are shown in Table 1.

For the evaluation of the results, two well-known password cracking tools, OMEN [34] and Prince⁷ were used. OMEN is a password cracking tool using a Markov model and produces password candidates in order of decreasing probability. Prince is a password candidate generator that uses one dictionary list to produce combinations of words as password candidates. Depending on the length specified, different combinations of words from the dictionary list are concatenated to create new password candidates.

While time is dependent on the resources available for password cracking, as a reference, using our HPC cluster,

⁶<https://www.ucd.ie/itservices/ourservices/researchit/researchcomputing/sonichpc/>

⁷<https://github.com/hashcat/princeprocessor>




FIGURE 3. Comb4 evaluated with CD_2, CD_3 and RockYou using OMEN.




FIGURE 5. Comb4 evaluated with CD_2, CD_3 and RockYou using Prince.




FIGURE 4. MangaTraders evaluated with CD_2, CD_3 and RockYou using OMEN.




FIGURE 6. Mangatraders evaluated with CD_2, CD_3 and RockYou using Prince.

each password cracking run with 10 billion guesses took approximately 9-10 hours for OMEN, while with Prince it took approximately 14-15 hours. It should be noted that the passwords were in plain text; therefore, no hashing was involved. The next section provides an overview of the experiments that were performed and an analysis of the results.

B. EVALUATION SECTION

Both Comb4 and MangaTraders were evaluated using CD_2, CD_3, and RockYou as input dictionaries. 10 billion password candidates were generated from each of the three evaluation dictionaries for both the OMEN and Prince attacks. The results of the cracking progress over time for CD_2, CD_3 and RockYou with Comb4 and MangaTraders using OMEN can be found in Figure 3 and Figure 4 respectively. Likewise, the results of the cracking progress over time for CD_2, CD_3 and RockYou with Comb4 and MangaTraders using Prince can be found in Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively.

A key difference between Figures 3 and 4 (which represents OMEN) and Figures 5 and 6 (which represents Prince), is that CD_2 is more performant compared to CD_3 using

TABLE 1. The size of the datasets involved in the experiments.

	Dataset	Size
Comb4	AxeMusic	252,752
	JeepForum	239,347
	Minecraft	143,248
	MangaTraders	618,237
Evaluation	CD_2	40,489
	CD_3	724,060
	RockYou	14,344,391

OMEN and CD_3 is better with Prince. The explanation for this resides in the inner configurations of each of these tools. For CD_2, which is significantly smaller than CD_3, there are more variations of the same password candidate being attempted for the constant fixed number of guesses, i.e., 10 billion for each password cracking run. For OMEN, which produces candidates in order of decreasing popularity, this means that the most likely candidates will be not only checked first, but checked with a higher number of variations, i.e., more mangling rules applied, in the case of CD_2 compared to CD_3. For Prince, which is based on combining




FIGURE 7. Passwords cracked by OMEN with CD_2, CD_3 and RockYou, classified by zxcvbn.

dictionary words, a larger dictionary list offers a wider range of combinations, and therefore CD_3 performs better.

As expected, RockYou performs the best using OMEN and Prince. The reason for this is that RockYou is a 14 million-long dictionary of real-world passwords, while CD_2 and CD_3 are 345 and 19 times smaller, respectively. Not only is the size difference significant, but RockYou is also a diverse dictionary that represents to a very large extent how people create their real-world passwords. RockYou is indicative of the password culture in our society, which is why it is one of the most popular dictionaries for password cracking attacks.

When comparing Figure 3 to Figure 4 and comparing Figure 5 to Figure 6, it is notable that the number of recovered passwords from MangaTraders is about half of what it is for Comb4. This is particularly interesting considering the fact that Comb4 contains 1,096,481 unique passwords, about twice as many as MangaTraders. This means that CD_2 and CD_3, have performed very well when the passwords they are trying to crack are of non-identical, but similar, context.

If the number of cracked passwords is the only metric taken into account, then RockYou is the best performer. In this case, a larger and more diverse dictionary list performs the best and cracks the most passwords. However, in many real world scenarios other measures of performance take precedent over the sheer number of recovered passwords. For example, if time is of the essence or a single, strong password needs to be cracked, RockYou might not be a good choice.

This is why it is important to also examine other metrics. For example, how strong are the passwords being cracked? For this, the password strength meter zxcvbn, which is the Dropbox-developed strength meter, has been used. According to this meter, passwords are classified into five different classes based on how easily they can be cracked. Class 0 is considered the most easy to crack, while Class 4 contains the passwords that are deemed the most difficult to crack.

Figure 7 shows how many passwords have been cracked per zxcvbn Class for CD_2, CD_3 and RockYou using




FIGURE 8. Passwords cracked by OMEN with CD_2, CD_3 and RockYou, classified by zxcvbn.

TABLE 2. Strength Distribution using zxcvbn for CD_2, CD_3 and RockYou, using OMEN.

	RockYou	CD_2	CD_3
Class 0	5,332	3,551	3,182
Class 1	182,719	87,260	61,519
Class 2	86,678	25,819	20,312
Class 3	15,110	2,003	2,220
Class 4	64	50	56

OMEN and Figure 8 shows the same results from using Prince. It can be seen that for both OMEN and Prince, the number of Class 1 passwords that have been cracked with RockYou is very large. The reason for this is that RockYou is a generic dictionary list of popular passwords. It is reasonable that RockYou would perform well for passwords that are easy to crack. With zxcvbn, passwords from Classes 0 to 2 belong to this “easy” category [7].

Tables 2 and 3 offer a breakdown of how many passwords were cracked by each dictionary per class and per cracking tool. As can be seen in Table 2, when it comes to Omen, for Class 4 passwords, all three dictionaries did not perform well. Nevertheless, CD_2 and CD_3 cracked almost as many passwords as RockYou, which is an important feat, given the discrepancy in dictionary size between the three dictionaries. When it comes to the rest of the classes, the results are more impressive, with the passwords found by CD_2 and CD_3 ranging between 13% and 47% of those found by RockYou in each Class. Looking at Prince, the results are comparable and most impressively, for Class 1, CD_3 found 80% of the passwords that RockYou found, as can be seen in Table 3. When it comes to Class 4, Prince was significantly better than OMEN, and CD_2 and CD_3 recovered approximately 12% of the passwords recovered by RockYou. However, the overlap of the results achieved using CD_2 and CD_3 versus RockYou is not what demonstrates the true value of the proposed approach.

If a real-world law enforcement password cracking scenario is considered, RockYou (or similar) can be used to

TABLE 3. Strength Distribution using zxcvbn for CD_2, CD_2 and RockYou using Prince.

	RockYou	CD_2	CD_3
Class 0	6,003	3,269	3,782
Class 1	193,001	114,135	155,925
Class 2	82,985	33,200	45,910
Class 3	15,817	2,355	4,558
Class 4	2,084	254	257

TABLE 4. Passwords found by only manga 2 layers or 3 layers (OMEN) Unique Passwords found using CD-2 and CD-3 that were not found by RY using OMEN.

	CD_2 Unique	CD_3 Unique
Class 0	106	72
Class 1	6,812	2,964
Class 2	4,721	2,430
Class 3	905	860
Class 4	49	52

TABLE 5. Passwords only found using the contextual-based approach of manga 2 layers or 3 layers (Prince).

	CD_2 Unique	CD_3 Unique
Class 0	12	12
Class 1	3,265	14,545
Class 2	4,092	12,927
Class 3	1283	2,619
Class 4	46	179

crack passwords while simultaneously using the approach proposed as part of this paper. The value of this approach lies in the analysis of the passwords that using CD_2 and CD_3 were able to crack that using RockYou alone did not. Table 4 outlines the number of unique passwords per class that were cracked solely by CD_2 and CD_3 respectively, and were not cracked by RockYou using OMEN and Table 5 shows the same for Prince. From these two tables, it can be observed that, in fact, there is value in running the context-based dictionary attack in conjunction with RockYou.

As mentioned before, for Class 4 passwords using OMEN, CD_2 cracked 50 passwords and RockYou cracked 64. However, what is notable about that is that 49 of those passwords recovered by CD_2 were unique to CD_2, bringing the total number of Class 4 passwords cracked to 113. This is an increase of 76.5% compared to simply running RockYou. A similar increase can be observed in the case of CD_3 in the recovery of unique passwords for CD_3 versus RockYou. Therefore, it can be observed that even though the absolute numbers are low compared to more easily crackable classes of passwords, the amount of extra passwords cracked with custom, targeted dictionaries is substantial.

Another class with a significant number of unique passwords cracked using CD_2 and CD_3 versus RockYou is Class 3, with a 5.7% and 5.4% increase of cracked passwords using CD_2 and CD_3 respectively. Overall, the fact that the extra percentage of unique passwords cracked using CD_2 and CD_3 were most significant for the two most difficult

classes proves that the proposed approach is valid and that targeted, contextual dictionary lists can offer a significant advantage to the cracking process. This can be put into context even more, if we consider a digital investigation with a tech-savvy suspect, where - if their password is vulnerable to dictionary attacks - it's still more likely to be Class 3 and above.

In general, the highest increase in found passwords was achieved with CD_3 and Prince. CD_2 achieved to find 10.1% more passwords that were not already recovered by Rock You. For Class 1 passwords this increases to 15.5%. This is a very significant percentage, especially considering that - as mentioned above - the custom dictionaries performed especially well with the classes of stronger passwords. It could be argued that when time is of the essence, the targeted approach (because the size of the dictionary list is much smaller) could be the first tool to be used in the toolkit of the investigator.

VI. DISCUSSION

The results of the above experiments show the impact of context on password cracking. Humans are creatures of habit; When choosing passwords, they tend to repeat words and patterns and select words that are familiar and meaningful to them. Their passwords must make sense for them so that they can remember them more easily. Even in the case of users choosing random words, e.g., a passphrase of four random dictionary words, the mechanism they use for password selection does provide insight. Of course, not everyone is like this. Many people nowadays use password managers and let the tool generate random, therefore secure passwords, on their behalf. Therefore, neither typical dictionary attacks nor context-based approaches would prove effective against them.

Nevertheless, there is merit to the proposed targeted dictionary approach. The experiments above demonstrate that, conclusively, context matters. In the case where an investigator has information about the individual(s) that are targeted in a case, this approach should be considered. If there is only a single suspect and there is need to act fast, it may prove more useful to use the proposed targeted approach first. As mentioned, RockYou is significantly larger than CD_2 and CD_3, which means it will take longer to execute. A smaller, more focused, bespoke dictionary using OMEN, which prioritizes the most likely password candidates first, might be the best option to choose in the first instance.

Of course, if the aim is to crack more than one password, other factors need to be considered, including how customizable the list should be. Is it better to start with one or more seed words? Is the number of passwords cracked enough to determine success, or is there a need for other, more sophisticated metrics, i.e., the number of passwords cracked in a specific amount of time or the strength of the cracked passwords? The quality of a dictionary can be measured in several different ways depending on the desired use case [32].

VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

The primary contribution of this paper is a novel framework for creating new, custom dictionary lists for any topic of interest that may be required – leveraging the power of structured information found on Wikipedia (and DBPedia). This can provide the blueprint for easily creating customized dictionary lists for any topic, combine them, tailor them according to how deep and comprehensive they need to be, and personalize them to the needs of each investigation.

A desirable by-product of the proposed approach is that it helps investigators crack passwords for topics about which they know little or nothing. For example, investigators do not have to know anything about the desired topic to be able to build a custom dictionary list of the most important words about that topic. Additionally, this dictionary generation utility helps investigators keep up with current trends in password cracking and easily create new dictionary lists to accommodate them.

Our experiments have demonstrated people that often, people choose passwords related to the topic of the website/system that the password is for, or are thematically close to that topic. Therefore, using a custom dictionary list can offer a significant advantage to the cracking process and ultimately result in higher success rates compared to using a generic dictionary alone. Our experiments show that the use of the proposed approach, in conjunction with existing approaches, results in up to 15.5% additional passwords being cracked over existing approaches alone. This increased likelihood of cracking a particular user's password could mean the difference between a digital investigation progressing or being stuck in its tracks.

Fortunately, there are many avenues to explore to further enriching the process of creating context based dictionaries. Other sources of contextual information that can be considered include Wiki articles, forums, and social media. For example, a Twitter hashtag could be a good starting point for creating a dictionary list containing what people have to say on a specific topic right now. It could also provide insight into the slang, colloquialisms, and common words or phrases associated with each keyword.

Furthermore, when it comes to the structure of the resultant dictionary list, identifying ways to prioritize candidates that are more relevant to the seed word can prove beneficial. Of course, because of the tree-like structure of Wikipedia, words found in the second layer can be assumed to be closer to the seed word than those in the third layer, but there is room to improve this process. One avenue of future work is to estimate how related a candidate word is to the seed word. In doing so, the resultant list of words could be prioritized, allowing the most related candidate words to be attempted first. This would additionally allow for the exclusion of irrelevant words. This could also be used to augment the dictionary with relevant words from additional sources, as mentioned above.

Finally, in terms of optimally applying this approach in real world scenarios, one focus for future work is to create a bank of precomputed seed word lists generated on common and popular topics so that they do not need to be regenerated whenever re-encountered.

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